| Management number | 233658933 | Release Date | 2026/06/27 | List Price | US$16.71 | Model Number | 233658933 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Category | |||||||||
This monograph analyzes Nicholas Rescher’s system of pragmatic idealism. It also looks at his approach to prediction in science. Coverage highlights a prominent contribution to a central topic in the philosophy and methodology of science. The author offers a full characterization of Rescher’s system of philosophy. She presents readers with a comprehensive philosophico-methodological analysis of this important work. Her research takes into account different thematic realms: semantic, logical, epistemological, methodological, ontological, axiological, and ethical. The book features three, thematic-parts: I) General Coordinates, Semantic Features and Logical Components of Scientific Prediction; II) Predictive Knowledge and Predictive Processes in Rescher’s Methodological Pragmatism; and III) From Reality to Values: Ontological Features, Axiological Elements, and Ethical Aspects of Scientific Prediction. This insightful analysis offers a critical reconstruction of Rescher’s philosophy. The system he created is often characterized as pragmatic idealism that is open to some realist elements. He is a prominent representative of contemporary pragmatism who has made a great deal of contributions to the study of this topic. This area is crucial for science and it has been little considered in the philosophy of science. Read more
| ASIN | B0759HNLXB |
|---|---|
| XRay | Not Enabled |
| ISBN13 | 978-3319630434 |
| Edition | 1st ed. 2017 |
| Language | English |
| File size | 859 KB |
| Page Flip | Enabled |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Word Wise | Enabled |
| Print length | 624 pages |
| Accessibility | Learn more |
| Screen Reader | Supported |
| Part of series | European Studies in Philosophy of Science |
| Publication date | August 30, 2017 |
| Enhanced typesetting | Enabled |
If you notice any omissions or errors in the product information on this page, please use the correction request form below.
Correction Request Form